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Abstract
It has been widely claimed and believed that many protocols in quantum key dis-
tribution, especially the single-photon BB84 protocol, have been proved unconditionally
secure at least in principle, for both asymptotic and finite protocols with realistic bit
lengths. In this paper it is pointed out that the only known quantitative justification
for such claims is based on incorrect assertions. The precise security requirements are
described in terms of the attacker’s sequence and bit error probabilities in estimating
the key. The extent to which such requirements can be met from a proper trace distance
criterion is established. The results show that the quantitative security levels obtainable
in concrete protocols with ideal devices do not rule out drastic breach of security unless
privacy amplification is more properly applied, while it is problematic whether a positive
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net key can be generated from current approaches.
In quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum effects that have no classical analog are
utilized for generating a sequence of bits (the secrey key K) between two parties A and B
that are known only to themselves. The typical approach involves information-disturbance
tradeoff in BB84 type protocols [1], but other quantum approaches without using such a
tradeoff is possible, say in KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) [2]. It has been
claimed since long ago and maintained to this day [3] that BB84 has been proved to possess
unconditional security (UCS), which is in fact the major advantage of QKD compared to
other known ciphers. What does UCS mean exactly?
In conventional classical key distribution such as the public key RSA scheme to which
QKD is often compared to, security is based on computational complexity that it is compu-
tationally difficult for an adversary E to compute the key though it is in principle possible.
This means K does not possess information-theoretic security (ITS), that there is no intrin-
sic probabilistic uncertainty to K. In this paper we assume the cryptosystem model is a
complete representation of all the relevant physical attributes of the cryptographic situation,
although the fact that it has not been in BB84 is a major loophole of concrete protocols [4].
Thus, UCS is to be discussed under the assumption that everything fits the ideal system
model, as such a security claim is usually so understood in the literature.
It is evident from the above description that UCS means no more than ITS for all possible
uses of K, assuming the laws of quantum mechanics are universal. This in turn means UCS
is a quantitative issue since it involves probability (as in fact quantum mechanics itself does)
and so the numerical value of the probability of E’s success in finding K gives one actual
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(unconditional) security level of the QKD protocol. Indeed, E may want to identify only
a portion of K, so her probabilities of finding various subsets K∗ of K are also important
quantitative criteria associated with UCS. In addition, when K is used in one-time pad
form (xor into the data bits), as often suggested for QKD to get true UCS instead of using
K as the seedkey of a conventional cipher such as AES, the number of actual bit errors
E makes in estimating K or its subsets from her attacks, to be called E’s bit error rates
(BER) in contrast to the above “sequence error probabilities”, would be relevant additional
quantitative criteria for UCS. Such leak would be equivalent to a leak from a nonuniform a
priori probability distribution on K.
One more major distinction needs to be made, raw security versus KPA security [5].
E can try to estimate the above probabilities from just the probe she set and the public
exchange before K is actually used. The quantitative results she so obtained give the raw
security of K. When K is actually used, E may obtain further information and she could in
principle make measurements on her probe after such information becomes available. The
resulting probabilities determine the “composition security” of K. We restrict to a specific
form of composition security that E could readily launch in many applications, known-
plaintext attacks (KPA). Indeed we would restrict to just KPA where a segment of K is
known to E exactly, say from knowing some data bits and of course the ciphertext bits when
K is used in one-time pad form. Such partial knowledge of K may help her determine the
rest of K and hence the rest of the data segment she did not know. KPA security refers
to these quantitative probabilities E may get. Note that ITS in raw security is obtained in
conventional key expansion [5] from a shared secret key which is also needed in QKD for
message authentication, but there is no IPS under known plaintext attacks.
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The ideal UCS or ITS is obtained when E has a uniform probability U(k) for all the
possible values of the n-bit generated key K and it is independent with whatever information
E may possess. It would be good UCS if such a situation is obtained with a sufficiently high
probability. This is precisely the claim that has been maintained in the QKD literature since
[6,7] to the recent review in [3] and beyond. We will also show the other mathematically
unspecific justifications of UCS in terms of “distinguishability advantage” is not applicable.
Both of these justifications are given by a trace-distance criterion d. In this paper we will
determine the extent d could provide quantitative UCS.
Before proceeding, it may be noted that this issue lies at the heart of the whole security
foundation of QKD, of exactly what security at what level with what empirical meaning
one can obtain from QKD. In contrast to most issues in physics, this cannot be decided by
an experiment and a careful conceptual and mathematical development is the only way to
resolve it.
Let K∗ be a subset of K from an arbitrary fixed subset of the n bit positions of K. Thus
K∗ contains 1 to n bits and may take one of 2|K
∗| possible values. Let p1(K
∗) be E’s optimal
probability of estimating K∗ from her attack. The probability p1(K) is especially important
because it is the probability of E successfully estimating the whole K. For raw security one
needs to upper bound each p1(k
∗) to an acceptable level, say
p1(k
∗) ≤ 2−|K
∗| + ǫ′ (1)
for some ǫ′ that may depend on |K∗|. This may happen only with a certain probability itself
depending on the exact value of K∗ and other system parameters. It is usually only possible
to usefully bound the average p1(K
∗) over the values of K∗, which replaces the individual
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value in the left side of (1). Such a bound can be converted to the form of (1) by application
of Markov Inequality.
Under KPA, E knows a subset X1 of the data X encrypted by K. In the one-time pad
format E would then know a corresponding segment K1 = k1 of K which she could use to
help her get other subsets K∗2 of K2 in the rest of K = k1
⋃
K2. For UCS one needs to
bound, for small ǫ′′ that may depend on |K1| and |K2|,
p1(k
∗
2|K1 = k1) ≤ 2
−|K∗
2
| + ǫ′′ (2)
when a portion K1 of K is known to be k1 and a subset K
∗
2 is to be estimated. Again, an
average over K1 and K
∗
2 may be needed to derive such bounds. Note that for a uniform key,
(1) would be satisfied with equality for ǫ′ = 0, and if it is independent of E’s information,
(2) would be similarly satisfied with ǫ′′ = 0, thus giving perfect UCS. If such a situation can
be obtained with high probability (from other random parameters in the system), then the
protocol has perfect UCS with a high probability, which is exactly the current claim [3,6,7].
Note that the criteria of (1)-(2) are the only operational meaningful security criteria
that any other criterion in the form of an information theoretic quantity [8] must reduce to,
including mutual information and variational distance. This should be clear if one asks the
question: so what is the empirical or operational guarantee given the criterion is at a given
level?
The claim that K gives the above perfect UCS with a high probability is made on behalf
of the trace distance criterion d defined as follows. During key generation E sets her probe
and the protocol goes forward. After privacy amplification the final key K is generated with
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corresponding “prior probability” p(k) and probe state ρkE on each k. Let
ρ =
∑
k
p(k) |k〉 〈k| (3)
for N orthonormal |k〉’s in space HK , N = 2
n. Let ρE =
∑
k p(k)ρ
k
E , ρKE =
∑
k p(k) |k〉 〈k|⊗
ρkE . The criterion d is defined to be
d ≡
1
2
‖ ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1 (4)
where ρU is given by (3) with p(k) = U(k) for the uniform random variable U . It can be
readily shown (similar to Lemma 2 in [6]) that
d =
1
2
∑
k
‖ p(k)ρkE −
1
N
ρE ‖1 (5)
A key K with d ≤ ǫ is called “ǫ-secure”, as it has been forced by privacy amplification to be
ǫ-close to U . But what is the operational meaning of d ≤ ǫ?
The major interpretation that has been given to d ≤ ǫ amounts to saying perfect UCS
is obtained with a probability ≥ 1 − ǫ. In [6] it is explicitly stated “The real and the ideal
setting can be considered identical with probability at least 1 − ǫ.” In [9,3] it is expressed
with a different nuance with ǫ understood as “maximum failure probability” of the protocol
“where ’failure’ means that ’something went wrong’, e.g., that an adversary might have
gained some information on K”.
The justification of such erroneous interpretation of d is derived from the interpretation
of Lemma 1 in [6] that the variational distance v(P,Q) between two distributions P and Q
on the same sample space, the classical counterpart of trace distance, “can be interpreted
as the probability that two random experiments described by P and Q, respectively, are
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different.” That this interpretation cannot be true in any situation has been discussed in
[5,10]. Here we give a simple example to bring out why.
Consider the distribution upon a measurement result with Pi =
1+2ǫ
N
for i ∈ 1− N
2
and
Pi =
1−2ǫ
N
for i ∈ (N
2
+ 1)−N , so that v(P, U) = ǫ. Then E “gains information” compared
to the ideal case with probability 1/2, not ǫ. This example clearly shows that variational
distance is not the maximum probability that information is leaked.
Operational security significance for d can be derived, however, from the classical prop-
erties of the variational distance between K and the uniform distribution U . Under d ≤ ǫ,
condition (1) holds for the K∗-averaged p1(K
∗) with ǫ′ = ǫ. We separate out the case for
the whole K due to its crucial role
p1(K) ≤
1
N
+ ǫ (6)
Under KPA, it is not possible to have p1(K
∗
2 |K1 = k1) lower bounded by a small number
because it can be arbitrarily close to 1 for any given K1 = k1. Such k2 can occur with
arbitrarily small but nonzero p(k) to satisfy any d ≤ ǫ constraint for nonzero ǫ. The best
one can hope for is a bound (2) when K1 itself is averaged over. This in fact holds under
d ≤ ǫ where the K1 and K
∗
2 averaged p1 satisfies
p1(K
∗
2 |K1) ≤ 2
−|K∗
2
| + ǫ (7)
We outline here the proof of (7) which covers the raw security of no conditioning as a
special case. Let Y be the measurement random variable of the relevant optimum quantum
measurement E makes. One can write,
p1(K
∗
2 |K1) =
∑
k1
p(k1) ·
∑
k∗
2
p(k∗2|k1)p(k
∗
2|k1) ·
∑
yǫIk∗
2
|k1
p(y)p(k∗2|yk1)
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where Ik∗
2
|k1 is the optimal decision region on K
∗
2 given K1 = k1, irrespective of K
′
2. From
equation (11.137) of [11] it follows that p(k∗2|yk1) ≤ p(k
∗
2|k1) + ǫy with
∑
y
p(y)ǫy = ǫ.
Extending the sum in yǫIk∗
2
|k1 over all y leads to (7).
Inequality (6) was previously given in [10], the full operational significance of d ≤ ǫ
is given here in (7) for the first time. These sequence error probabilities constitute the
appropriate criteria when K is used as the seed key in a conventional cipher such as AES.
For the more commonly suggested use of K in one-time pad form, the bit error rate (BER)
is also important because E may get many bits correctly even when she gets the whole K∗
wrong. This is the common distinction between sequence error rate and bit error rate in
ordinary communications. BER is defined to be the per bit error probability, withN∗ = 2|K
∗|,
pb ≡ Pb(K) =
1
N∗
N∗∑
i=1
Pe(i) (8)
where Pe(i) is the probability that the ith bit in K
∗ is incorrectly obtained from Eve’s
estimate of K∗. Here we summarize the BER result in [11].
The only known general lower bound on Pb is the Fano Inequality [11], which gives in
this case, with Iac being E’s quantum accessible information,
nH(pb) ≥ H(K)− Iac (9)
where H(·) is the binary entropy function and H(K∗) the entropy of K∗. The H(K) for K
is determined by p(k) in (3). From d we can bound H(K) by [11, theorem 17.3.3] which
yields, for pb =
1
2
− ǫ′ and small ǫ′, ǫ′ ≤ (ǫ/4 log e)1/2. Since Markov Inequality needs to be
used twice before this ǫ′ is applied, it is similar to the case of using it three times and the
final ǫ′ in (1) is thus
ǫ′ ≤ ǫ
1
4/2
√
log e (10)
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As expected, the BER guarantee from (11) is worse than that of the corresponding sequence
error probability.
In contrast to the sequence error case, there is no result similar to(6)-(7) for subsets
K∗ or K∗2 because there is no lower bound on H(K
∗) or H(K∗2 |K1) from d or H(K), and
it is possible to have arbitrarily small but nonzero H(K∗) especially when conditioned on
K1 = k1. Thus, the result on BER is limited to E’s attack on the whole K in raw security.
There is an original argument [15] that purports to show d has general raw and com-
position security from its mere form of (4), because the optimum binary quantum decision
probability Pc between two states ρo and ρ1 with a priori probability Po and P1 is given by
Pc =
1
2
+ ||Poρo − P1ρ1||1 (11)
and the two terms in (4) represent the real and the ideal situation, thus d provides a bound on
the “distinguishability advantage”. However, E is not trying to distinguish the two situations
by a binary decision, thus (4) and (12) give the wrong criterion in either raw or KPA security.
The correct criteria are (1)-(2) in terms of E’s probability of success in identifying various
K∗. Note also that (4) is itself a fictitious representation and in any case not available to E,
or she could just measure on HK to get K. The form (5) for d is much less misleading than
the entanglement form (4). Further discussion can be found in [10].
That “universal composable security” does not follow from (4) and (12) is especially clear
in the case of BER where no bound on pb(K
∗
2 |K1) can apparently be derived from d ≤ ǫ,
due to the very nonlinear relation between pb and d already apparent in (10). To establish a
security claim, one needs to write down mathematically what is being claimed and provide
a derivation from given, in this case d ≤ ǫ. The incorrect “maximum failure probability”
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interpretation of d gives such a derivation for raw and composition security, but it cannot
be true. We have provided the correct security guarantee (6)-(7) and (10)-(11) from d ≤ ǫ,
but they are far weaker than those from the incrorect interpretations [12].
The significant point in this correction is that E makes an N -ary decision in estimating
K, or an N∗-ary decision in estimating K∗. From the viewpoint of a binary decision for (4)
and (12) with P0 =
1
2
, d = 2−10 may appear sufficient. However, for an N -ary decision with,
say n = 1, 000, it follows from (6) that such a d value does not rule out a disastrous breach
of security: that the whole 1,000 bits key may be obtained with a 0.1% probability. It is
clear the problem is one needs to look at the quantitative security level with respect to a
proper reference level.
There is the persistent intuition that a criterion should be fine if the level is brought
down to a sufficiently small value, assuming the value is zero in the ideal case. This is true
if the value is exactly zero, but the whole question is how small is sufficiently small, or what
the reference level is. It is a quantitative issue through and through, UCS does not imply
security if its level is not good. In this connection, it may be pointed out that Iac has been
used as the QKD security criterion from the beginning till some work to date. It has been
largely abandoned in the theory literature because it does not rule out possible disastrous
leaks from quantum information locking against KPA when E has quantum memory [13, 14].
Indeed, the incorrect interpretation of d was proposed [13] in place of [15] for exactly such
problem. On the other hand, it can be shown [16] that if Iac is small enough such locking
information cannot be utilized either. A good reference level for this with an n-bit key is
d = 2−n.
The raw security guarantee (6) from d [17] is totally inadequate for the analyzed finite
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protocols with their numerical values of the parameters, as follows. The most up to date
finite-key analysis of the single photon BB84 protocol with no loss and ideal devices [18]
gives typical d levels of 10−9 for 5% QBER and 10% key rate, for n ∼ 105 at the limit of
present day error correcting code block length. After MAI is applied twice for K and privacy
amplification averaging, the resulting individual probability guarantee with d
1
3 is 10−3. That
is, it is not ruled out that Eve may have an estimate that has a probability of 0.001 of finding
the whole 10,000 bit key, a disastrous breach of security. In such case, there is effectively
only a 10 bit protection of the 10,000 bit key. The BER guarantee of (9)-(11) shows E has
pb ∼ 0.49 instead of 0.5 when attacking the whole K, which for n = 10
5 amounts to knowing
1,000 bits more, considerably bigger than a favorable (to E) binomial fluctuation level of
∼ 200. In the NEC experimental decoy state system [19] the criterion Iac was used but a
corresponding p1(K) is also given [20] consistent with the result of [2], with p1(K) ∼ 10
−6
for n ∼ 4, 000. After a cube root to d this implies the probability guarantee is the way too
large 1% with BER pb ∼ 0.4 error probability. These results show that a much smaller d
value needs to be guaranteed in privacy amplification. See [21].
In conclusion, we have specified the operational requirement of unconditional security in
cryptography and determined the extent it can be satisfied by the trace distance criterion
d ≤ ǫ. It is seen that the d values given in the literature for finite protocols are very far
from ruling out possible drastic breach of security. In addition, the results point to a serious
gap in the security proofs in connection with current treatments of error correction, and as
a consequence no concrete full protocol has been proved secure even under just collective
attacks [21]. It appears radically new elements need to be introduced to make QKD provably
secure with meaningful levels of security and key rate.
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